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Note 
 
Copyrighted Laws: Enabling and Preserving 
Access to Incorporated Private Standards 
James M. Sweeney* 
In 1997, a north Texas nonprofit regional-information web-
site posted the municipal building code laws of two nearby ru-
ral towns.1 The original drafter of those codes, a private code 
developer, issued a copyright infringement cease and desist to 
the website owner demanding removal of the laws.2 In re-
sponse, the website operator filed suit seeking a non-
infringement declaration, and the code developer filed a coun-
terclaim for copyright infringement.3 Both the district court and 
a Fifth Circuit panel sided with the code developer upholding 
its copyright infringement claim.4 On rehearing en banc, how-
ever, a deeply divided Fifth Circuit narrowly reversed for the 
operator, holding that laws are in the public domain and not 
subject to the exclusive control of a copyright holder.5 This se-
quence of holdings is troublesome. Over 120 years ago, the Su-
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2006, 
Minnesota State University Moorhead. I would like to extend gratitude to Pro-
fessor Dan Gifford for furthering my knowledge of copyright law. A special 
thank you to Hannah Nelson whose continual involvement helped polish the 
many fragmented, wee-hour revisions into a fluid form. Thanks to the editors 
and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review that contributed their time, specifi-
cally Robert Gallup, Maisie Baldwin, Joe Janochoski, and Karrah Johnston. I 
want to recognize Professor Anne Alexander and Craig Garaas-Johnson for 
their positive influence at key times long before the existence of this Note. 
Lastly, I must express endless and humbled appreciation to my family and 
friends for their many years of unconditional patience and understanding 
while I learned to look at the world in a different way. For you. Copyright © 
2017 by James M. Sweeney. 
 1. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 
2002) (en banc). 
 2. See id. at 794. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 
2001); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 
1999). 
 5. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 793. 
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preme Court held and later reaffirmed that copyright could not 
be held in judicial opinions.6 Since then, courts have broadly 
applied the precedent to all forms of laws, including statutes 
and regulations.7 So why would this developer seek to enforce a 
copyright infringement claim for publishing a statute, and be 
successful in getting both a district court and an appellate 
court to rule contrary to a universal precedent? 
As a growing trend, private organizations create and vol-
unteer to lawmakers thousands of model safety codes and in-
dustry standards (also known as voluntary consensus stand-
ards or Standards Developing Organization (SDO) standards), 
which lawmakers enact as law through a process known as “in-
corporation by reference.”8 Incorporation by reference allows 
lawmakers to give legal force to one of these standards by 
merely publishing the name of the standard inside the body of 
a law, instead of publishing the actual text of the entire stand-
ard. This results in thousands of statutes and regulations that 
do not contain any content—just the name of a standard—yet 
carry penalties for noncompliance as if the standard’s actual 
contents were published inside the law. Members of the public 
seeking to comply with the law must then obtain the standard 
from the organization that authored it. The organizations as-
sert copyright over their standards and typically charge the 
public fees to access them.9 In some instances, the organiza-
tions file copyright infringement suits against anyone for pub-
lishing, printing, or distributing their standard that has been 
 
 6. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834) (“[N]o reporter . . . can 
have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court . . . .”); see 
also Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“The whole work done by 
the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, 
which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all . . . .” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 7. See, e.g., Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898) (“[N]o one can 
obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of a state . . . .”); Georgia v. Har-
rison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (“[T]his court holds that a 
state may not copyright its statutes . . . .”). 
 8. Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Per-
plexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 
739 (2014) [hereinafter Mendelson, Private Control] (“The CFR today contains 
nearly 9,500 . . . standards . . . .”); Nina A. Mendelson, Taking Public Access to 
the Law Seriously: The Problem of Private Control over the Availability of Fed-
eral Standards, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10776, 10776 (2015) [hereinafter 
Mendelson, Taking Public Access]. 
 9. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 743. In Veeck, the website 
operator purchased copies of the law directly from the developer. 293 F.3d at 
793. 
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enacted into law.10 This practice is not a minor, infrequent oc-
currence; sales of these incorporated standards generate mil-
lions of dollars in revenue annually from members of the public 
who simply need to know their legal obligations.11 
Concealing laws from the public and controlling access to 
them with fees and threats of litigation raises significant due 
process concerns. In the United States, ignorance of a statute 
or regulation is not a defense to its violation.12 To remain con-
sistent with that principle, Congress has promoted accessibility 
and transparency to laws by establishing government printing 
programs and freely distributing legal materials to local deposi-
tories and Internet websites.13 Also, throughout history the 
government has taken action when affluence has been used as 
a control to fundamental rights and necessities.14 Recognizing 
that controlling access to laws runs contrary to these princi-
ples, there have been some attempts—without addressing copy-
right law—to make the copyrighted standards available to the 
public.15 But these attempts have all generally failed for three 
reasons. First, government reliance on private standards is sys-
temic so they cannot simply be abandoned in favor of govern-
ment-made alternatives. Second, incorporated standards are 
not traditional laws, they are legitimate copyrighted works that 
laws incorporate after copyright has been bestowed. Lastly, 
lawmakers are thus barred from any action infringing the own-
 
 10. See, e.g., Veeck, 293 F.3d at 794 (“SBCCI counterclaimed for copyright 
infringement . . . .”); Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs. v. Code Tech., Inc. 
(BOCA), 628 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 1980) (“BOCA says it holds a copyright for 
its [enacted code], which defendant CT has allegedly infringed.”); see also infra 
note 218 and accompanying text (listing currently pending infringement litiga-
tion). 
 11. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the tax disclosures of some SDOs). 
 12. See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 
(1971). 
 13. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 764–66 (quoting H.R. 
JOURNAL, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 328–29 (1795)) (“[M]ost conducive to the general 
information of the people.”); see, e.g., U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., https://www.gpo 
.gov (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). 
 14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (abolishing federal poll taxes); 
see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding any 
wealth-based electoral standard unconstitutional). 
 15. E.g., Pub. L. No. 113-30, 127 Stat. 510 (2013) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 60102(p)) (requiring an agency to only incorporate standards that are freely 
available); Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,273–74 (Nov. 7, 
2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (categorically rejecting solutions to in-
corporation by reference that may have any negative implication on an organi-
zation’s copyright). 
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er’s copyright, regardless of placement in any law. Since the 
Copyright Code fails to expressly address the copyright of laws 
or any work that possesses legal effect, an analysis of how ex-
isting copyright doctrines may be construed to enable free ac-
cess to incorporated standards is due. 
This Note argues that existing copyright doctrines do not 
provide any solution for altering the copyrightability of incorpo-
rated standards, and under the current statutes the incorpo-
rated standards still maintain their copyright. To fully resolve 
this problem, then, copyright revision is necessary to make the 
legal obligations created by incorporation by reference freely 
available to the public. Part I of this Note introduces voluntary 
consensus standards and describes how they become enacted 
into law. This Part also explains the copyright protections ex-
tended to both voluntary consensus standards and laws. Part II 
examines how copyright cannot properly analyze copyrighted 
works that subsequently become law in the same manner as 
traditional laws, perpetuating the conflict. Part III argues for 
two copyright law provisions that would make laws ineligible 
for copyright and assign works with legal force to the public 
domain. 
I.  VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS, LAWS, AND 
HOW COPYRIGHT TREATS THEM DIFFERENTLY   
Voluntary consensus standards are uniform rules created 
by private nonprofit entities to promote safety, predictability, 
and uniformity amongst industries and trades. Upon creation, 
these standards receive copyright protection. Incorporation by 
reference is a frequent lawmaking tactic that directly adopts 
these standards into law, not by duplicating their copyrighted 
contents word-for-word inside of the statute or regulation, but 
by simply referring to the name of the standard.16 These mere 
references force the public to seek out the standard from its de-
veloper, who generally charges a licensing fee to obtain it. Tra-
ditionally, access to laws (in any form) cannot be controlled by a 
copyright holder. But the control asserted here is not over a 
law—it is over a copyrighted work that a separate law requires 
 
 16. See Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-
Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134, 139–41 (2013) [herein-
after Bremer, Open Age] (discussing the benefits and ongoing emphasized 
agency use of SDO standards); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organiza-
tions and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 505–06 (2013) (dis-
cussing saturation of agency selection). 
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verbatim compliance with at risk of penalty. The Copyright 
Code itself does not explicitly address the eligibility of works 
that possess legal force. Thus, lawmakers cannot take any ac-
tion that would infringe the copyright, nor is there any statuto-
ry method of removing the copyright. This sets up the issue at 
hand: lawmakers are dependent upon private standards, which 
upon adoption must remain under the exclusive control of their 
authors. This forces the general public to either spend money to 
comply or blindly risk violating regulations. 
At the center of this conflict are two conceptually opposite 
aspects of law. One is copyright—the grant of exclusive rights 
to incentivize useful works.17 The other is open access—the due 
process principle that laws must be freely accessible to the pub-
lic.18 The challenge to this issue is preserving both. This Part 
summarizes these two conflicting concepts. Section A provides 
an introduction to voluntary consensus standards and the lo-
gistics of how incorporation by reference gives some of them le-
gal force. Section B explores how copyright applies to voluntary 
consensus standards, which will be analyzed further in Part II. 
Section C explains why laws cannot be subject to copyright. 
A. VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND HOW THEY 
RECEIVE LEGAL FORCE 
The popularity of incorporation by reference among all lev-
els of lawmaking is a direct response to the high quality of vol-
untary consensus standards.19 Subsection 1 outlines what vol-
untary consensus standards are and where they come from. 
Subsection 2 explains how incorporation by reference gives 
them legal effect in the context of federal regulations.20 
 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting “[e]xclusive rights in copyrighted 
works”); see also infra Part I.B (further discussing applicable copyright provi-
sions). 
 18. Even the most notorious, unforgiving lawmakers of antiquity did not 
hide laws from the citizens subject to their punishments. See RONALD S. 
STROUD, DRAKON’S LAW ON HOMICIDE 74 (1968) (noting the code of Drakon, 
“which had been written on [public wooden tablets]”). 
 19. Some authors have called into question whether SDO standards are 
really inherently valuable at all. See, e.g., Mendelson, Private Control, supra 
note 8, at 761 (scrutinizing SDO internal process as not representative, unac-
countable to authorities, and lacking transparency). 
 20. When examples or context is needed, this Note will use federal regula-
tions as the level of lawmaking that employs incorporation by reference be-
cause of their national effect and near-total saturation of using voluntary con-
sensus standards in lieu of any other type. 
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1. Origin of Voluntary Consensus Standards 
Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) are sophisti-
cated private entities that develop and publish voluntary con-
sensus standards.21 The standards establish industry-wide uni-
form systems of safety or manufacturing, and cover a broad 
range of daily life such as automobile lighting, exhaust sys-
tems, and the energy usage of an air conditioner.22 The dangers 
of deviating from these standards are well documented and 
tragic, often found in immense industrial explosions or struc-
tural collapses.23 Thus, industry-wide adoption of even a single 
standard promotes quality, compatibility, and predictability in 
the marketplace. 
The network of SDOs in the United States is extensive. 
SDOs are comprised of constituent “members” representing 
many different industries and interests, such as government 
professionals, corporate trade companies, and safety-
certification organizations.24 There are hundreds of SDO enti-
ties just in the United States, and each individual SDO can 
have membership reaching thousands.25 These SDOs have a 
prolific impact. There are more than one hundred thousand 
voluntary consensus standards in use throughout the United 
States and the largest SDOs have multi-million dollar revenue 
streams from selling training products, annotated standards, 
and certifications.26 
 
 21. Strauss, supra note 16, at 499. 
 22. The Scope of Copyright Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. 92 (2014) [hereinafter Scope Hearings] (statement of Carl Mal-
amud, President, Public.Resource.Org). 
 23. Id. at 90 (statement of Carl Malamud, President, Pub-
lic.Resource.Org). See generally John M. Broder, Panel Says Firms Knew of 
Cement Flaws Before Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2010/10/29/us/29spill.html (noting cementing standards were ignored in 
Deepwater Horizon disaster); Steven Greenhouse, BP To Pay Record Fine for 
Refinery, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/ 
business/13bp.html (referencing safety code violations in 2005 Texas City re-
finery tragedy). 
 24. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 16, at 539–40 (discussing the member-
ship makeup of the North American Energy Standards Board). 
 25. Id. at 500; see Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 
793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[C]onsisting of approximately 14,500 members 
. . . .”). 
 26. Emily S. Bremer, A Multidimensional Problem, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10783, 10784 (2015) [hereinafter Bremer, Multidimensional]; see Scope Hear-
ings, supra note 22, at 94–95 (statement of Carl Malamud, President, Pub-
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Even though a voluntary consensus standard by itself does 
not carry the force of a law, the process of developing a stand-
ard mirrors traditional lawmaking.27 SDO members are in-
volved in an intricate process of writing, commenting, and 
adoption of standards,28 sometimes taking up to five years to fi-
nalize.29 Since SDOs are private entities, they are not required 
to disclose their exact development procedures and each SDO 
has its own unique development process.30 For example, some 
SDOs allow outside non-members to participate and others 
may have traditional membership-only participation.31 The 
careful vetting practice matched with each member’s expertise 
creates high-quality standards. 
2. How Voluntary Consensus Standards Become Law 
For the past few decades, the federal government has in-
creasingly relied on voluntary consensus standards in lawmak-
ing. The first use began with the Reagan administration’s Cir-
cular A-119, which encouraged federal agencies to consider and 
utilize voluntary consensus standards in their regulations and 
rulemaking.32 In 1996 Congress went further and passed the 
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 
(NTTAA) requiring federal agencies to use voluntary consensus 
standards in place of government-authored standards where 
such usage was sufficient.33 Circular A-119 was then updated in 
1998 to provide additional guidance to agencies for vetting the 
 
lic.Resource.Org); infra Part III.C.2 (discussing SDO revenue reported on 
Form 990 tax disclosures). 
 27. See OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8553–54 (Feb. 19, 1998) 
(noting force of law comes from agency adoption into regulations). 
 28. Strauss, supra note 16, at 501; see also OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 8546, 8554, § 4(a)(1) (1998) (listing characteristics common to SDO 
standard development processes). 
 29. See Lydia DePillis, Should Legal Codes Be Copyrighted? Let’s Sue To 
Find Out!, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2013), http://wpo.st/SxlJ1 (“Most of ASTM’s 
standards are on a five-year development timeline . . . .”). 
 30. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 759 (“[F]ull public 
access to SDO decisionmaking is limited . . . .”). 
 31. Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10778. 
 32. Strauss, supra note 16, at 504. See generally OMB Circular A-119, 63 
Fed. Reg. 8546 (1998) (issuing White House directive to agencies regarding 
revised procedure and guidelines for SDO standard use). 
 33. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. 
L. No. 104-113, § 12(a)(3), 110 Stat. 775, 782 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 272(b)(3) (2012)) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce “to coordinate the 
use by Federal agencies of private sector standards, emphasizing where possi-
ble the use of standards developed by private, consensus organizations”). 
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development history of a standard before adopting it into law.34 
Since then, agencies have almost exclusively adopted SDO 
standards in their rulemaking, in lieu of writing standards 
themselves.35 
Federal law requires all binding agency regulations to be 
published in the Federal Register.36 When the Federal Register 
and Code of Federal Regulations began to swell in size, Con-
gress sought to reduce page quantities by using a practice 
known as incorporation by reference.37 Incorporation by refer-
ence creates an exception to the Federal Register publishing 
mandate, allowing agencies to merely refer to SDO standards 
by name in lieu of publishing the text of the standard.38 The on-
ly requirement for this publishing exemption is that the stand-
ard be made “reasonably available to the class of persons af-
fected.”39 “Reasonably available” simply means providing a 
physical copy for inspection in Washington, D.C.40 Thus, if one 
were to look up a regulation in the Federal Register that incor-
porated a voluntary consensus standard by reference, the text 
of the standard would not be published despite being given full 
 
 34. Strauss, supra note 16, at 504–05; see also OMB Circular A-119, 63 
Fed. Reg. 8546, 8554 (1998) (defining SDO processes that help satisfy agency 
policy). 
 35. In a 2013 report for the preceding year, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology found only a single instance of an agency using a 
government-developed standard in lieu of an SDO standard, in contrast to us-
ing 423 SDO standards, some of which even replaced older government-
developed standards. Strauss, supra note 16 (citing NATHALIE RIOUX, NIST, 
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF VOLUNTARY 
CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 1 (2013)). 
 36. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012) (“Each agency shall separately state 
and currently publish in the Federal Register.”). 
 37. Strauss, supra note 16, at 502. 
 38. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10776–78; see also 
Incorporation by Reference, 1 C.F.R. § 51.9(b)(4) (2015) (requiring a showing 
that referenced standards are available for inspection); cf. Strauss, supra note 
16, at 518–19 (suggesting Congress had a wider availability in mind for “rea-
sonably available” than what is currently viewed as sufficient). Much debate 
centers just on what amount of access is required to statutorily satisfy “rea-
sonably available” in today’s digital age and to what extent the government 
should be accountable for providing it. Compare, e.g., Bremer, Open Age, supra 
note 16, at 156–59 (arguing access should be broad and agencies bear respon-
sibility for ensuring availability), with Strauss, supra note 16, at 523–24 (ar-
guing the Internet has eliminated the “space-saving rationale” of incorporation 
by reference and created new access obligations for the Office of the Federal 
Register). 
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legal force as if it were. For example, the regulation that speci-
fies the criteria for OSHA-compliant protective eyewear simply 
states, “devices must comply with any of the following consen-
sus standards . . . .”41 That regulation then lists three different 
standards, only by name, and provides no further information.42 
This means anyone wishing to see the standard must 
search for it. The standards generally cannot be found on the 
Internet or in government depositories, meaning the public 
must obtain the standard from the SDO that authored it.43 The 
SDOs often claim a copyright in the standard and charge a li-
cense fee to obtain a copy. In the instances where the SDO pro-
vides the standard with no charge, they still reserve the right 
to limit access or begin charging a fee.44 The fees for the stand-
ards are arbitrarily set by the SDO.45 The fees may range in 
amount, for example, from $91.50 for the Minnesota State Fire 
Code to $6000 for a Medicare prescription drug standard.46 In 
the context of the above OSHA regulation, the public must ei-
ther pay $57 to comply with the law, or risk a $12,471 fine by 
blindly going without it.47 
The government did not anticipate that SDOs would claim 
copyright over the standards, but rather expected them to be 
widely available in libraries or commercial publications.48 De-
spite this unexpected assertion of copyright, SDOs continue to 
maintain this control because Circular A-119 directs agencies 
 
 41. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.133(b)(1) (2016). 
 42. Id. § 1910.133(b)(1)(i)–(iii). 
 43. See Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10776; Strauss, 
supra note 16. 
 44. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 753. Even in the instanc-
es where SDOs do provide “free” access, it is only under strict conditions with-
in their exclusive control, and users accessing it must sign waivers for chal-
lenging the copyright claims. Id. 
 45. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 507 (“[T]he monopoly price a valid copy-
right would permit a private organization ‘owning’ that legal obligation to 
charge.”). 
 46. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 744; INT’L CODE 
COUNCIL, MINN. ST. FIRE CODE (2007), http://shop.iccsafe.org/minnesota-state 
-fire-code.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). See generally MINN. R. 7511.0010–
7511.8440 (2016) (Minnesota State Fire Code Regulation). 
 47. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(3)–(4) (2016) (penalties for violation); ANSI 
Webstore, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail 
.aspx?sku=ANSI%2fISEA+Z87.1-2010+Package (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). 
 48. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 519 (citing S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 4–5 
(1964)). The legislature anticipated commercial publishers would issue compi-
lations of incorporated standards, thus making Federal Register printing re-
dundant. See S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 4 (1964). 
  
1340 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1331 
 
to “observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder.”49 
This has multiple implications. First, it prevents agencies from 
just publishing the contents of the standard for free, meaning 
the public is forced to buy it from the SDOs.50 Second, it means 
that all incorporated standards are voluntarily offered as can-
didates for incorporation by the owner organization, as opposed 
to the agencies forcefully adopting them.51 Third, this means 
current agency policy does not recognize a standard’s copyright, 
nor its pricing, as a preclusion to incorporation.52 
Lastly, it means an incorporated standard that has even 
been superseded and outdated by its own SDO still maintains 
copyright respect as long as the regulation referencing it still 
exists.53 This especially has a wide-reaching impact, as most of 
the standards referenced in the Code of Federal Regulations 
are outdated and no longer represent SDO consensus yet still 
require payment of a fee.54 Many outdated SDO standards re-
main legally binding despite being unable to be found or, in 
some cases, subsequently shown to be hazardous.55 This lag oc-
curs because the Office of the Federal Register does not permit 
a regulation to automatically update whenever its respective 
standard is revised.56 So a regulation cannot simply state the 
criteria of compliance as “whatever the most recent version” of 
a standard is. Regulations may only incorporate existing 
standards—not hypothetical standards with uncertain con-
tents—and may only be updated with new rulemaking.57 
In conclusion, incorporation by reference places SDOs in a 
very favorable position. Agencies must use voluntary consensus 
 
 49. OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8555, § 6( j) (1998). 
 50. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2012). 
 51. This is not a takings issue; this is a fully aware business decision. See 
generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”). 
 52. See Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10778. 
 53. Strauss, supra note 16, at 507. 
 54. Id. at 506–07. 
 55. E.g., 46 C.F.R. § 160.041-4(b) (2014) (requiring, pursuant to a 1941 
Coast Guard regulation, that first aid kits contain phenacetin, now interna-
tionally recognized as a carcinogen). SDOs have no obligation to keep stand-
ards available after incorporation, and there is discussion of whether an una-
vailable standard renders its regulation unenforceable. See Mendelson, Taking 
Public Access, supra note 8, at 10779. 
 56. See 1 C.F.R. § 51.1(f ) (2016) (“Incorporation by reference of a publica-
tion is limited to the edition of the [standard] that is approved. Future 
amendments or revisions of the [standard] are not included.”). 
 57. Strauss, supra note 16, at 506. 
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standards and cannot violate their copyright when doing so. 
This enables the organizations to receive an exclusive self-
priced revenue stream that exists for the lifetime of the regula-
tion even where the standard is outdated or abandoned.58 There 
is seemingly no obligation requiring the SDO to sustain availa-
bility of the standard or maintain any involvement once the 
standard is incorporated. These benefits showcase why organi-
zations never decline to have their standards incorporated into 
law, and often refuse to make their standards free to the pub-
lic.59 
B. HOW COPYRIGHT APPLIES TO VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS 
STANDARDS 
Voluntary consensus standards are copyright protected 
works. The owner of a copyrighted work receives exclusive con-
trol over the reproduction, derivation, and distribution of that 
work. This grant provides SDOs with the power to control their 
standards—a power that agencies cannot infringe upon. An in-
corporated standard creates a unique situation because the or-
ganizations do not author a law—they author a copyrighted 
standard—and the designation of legal force comes after the 
copyright grant. Since copyright is created by statute, the stat-
ute must dictate the terms upon which a copyright ceases. 
Some judicial copyright doctrines and sections of the Copyright 
Code provide an intuitive starting point for resolving copyright 
control of an incorporated standard, but, as this Note will argue 
later, none are sufficient. For now, a discussion of copyright 
fundamentals is necessary in order to understand the nuances 
that will be introduced later. Subsection 1 will outline the rele-
vant statutory basics of copyright and how they apply to volun-
tary consensus standards. Subsection 2 will discuss the rights 
of copyright owners and some limits to those rights. 
1. The Purpose, Basics, and Scope of Copyright 
The primary purpose of copyright is to incentivize future 
authors by granting them temporary exclusive rights over their 
works. In exchange, when the copyright expires, the work be-
comes public domain so the public and society may benefit from 
 
 58. See supra notes 44, 53, and accompanying text. 
 59. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 127–28 (testimony of Carl Mal-
amud, President, Public.Resource.Org) (“I have never seen a standards body 
object to one of their documents becoming incorporated by law.”). 
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its use.60 This purpose is expressed in the Constitution, which 
gives Congress authority to create copyright law.61 That author-
ity is currently codified as the Copyright Act of 1976, which has 
been amended several times.62 The Copyright Code specifically 
dictates where copyright applies and where it does not. 
An author may receive copyright protection in “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression 
. . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.”63 An author is anyone to whom a work owes its 
origin.64 A work is fixed when “its embodiment . . . is sufficient-
ly permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”65 Moreover, an original work is one “independently 
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) 
. . . possess[ing] at least some minimal degree of creativity.”66 
These requirements implicate a wide variety of subjects and 
forms of creativity, such as literature, photographs, and archi-
tectural plans.67 
There are limits, however, on which aspects of a work re-
ceive copyright protection. For example, facts are excluded from 
copyright protection because they are not original to an au-
thor.68 Utilitarian aspects of copyrighted visual works are also 
excluded, such as the wiring or bulb socket of a sculpture used 
as a table lamp.69 
 
 60. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[P]romote the progress of . . . useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their respective 
writings . . . .”); see also Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127 (“Congress did not 
sanction an existing right, but created a new one.”). 
 62. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as Title 17 of the United 
States Code); see, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending duration of copyrights); Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (establish-
ing criminal penalties for infringement). 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 64. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884). 
 65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing a definition of “fixed”). 
 66. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 67. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8) (listing specific types of protected works). 
 68. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345. 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing a definition of “[p]ictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works” and “useful article”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
218 (1954) (noting copyright protection does not extend to “mechanical or utili-
tarian aspects”). 
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The most difficult determination for copyright, however, is 
the idea/expression dichotomy. Copyright law grants authors 
protection for their original expressions, but permits other au-
thors to “build freely upon the ideas . . . conveyed by [the] 
work.”70 Thus, any ideas present in a copyrighted work are not 
protected.71 But even the circuit courts agree that differentiat-
ing between an idea and an expression is a difficult task.72 If 
the level of abstraction for an idea is set very narrowly, subse-
quent authors may lawfully copy large amounts of an original 
work to the detriment of the author. But if the level is set too 
high, the original author could claim copyright over broad gen-
eralizations like “romance novel” to the detriment of future au-
thors and the public.73 Thus, for any inquiry, the 
idea/expression line needs to be drawn in a position that pro-
vides benefits to an author but still permits other authors to 
build upon the ideas of that work.74 
Further complicating this abstraction are scenarios where 
an expression cannot be separated from its idea at all. When 
one cannot separate an expression from its idea, the expression 
then cannot be copyrighted. This concept is known as the mer-
ger doctrine.75 The merger doctrine was developed by the 
courts76 as a means of protecting ideas with limited numbers of 
 
 70. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 349–50 (emphasis added). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) 
(stating an author cannot have copyright over methods of operation); 37 C.F.R. 
§ 202.1(b) (2016). 
 72. See, e.g., Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he line between an expression and an idea can be difficult to determine 
. . . .”); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 
1993) (“Determining which elements . . . are protectable is a difficult task.”); 
Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“Drawing the line between idea and expression is a tricky business.”); Robert 
R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Other 
courts have also struggled to balance these competing concerns . . . .”); Apple 
Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“[Courts] draw[ing] the line between an idea and expression have found diffi-
culty in articulating where it falls.”). 
 73. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 
1930) (describing how removing copyrighted portions of a story piece by piece 
eventually leaves “no more than the most general statement of what the play 
is about, and at times might consist only of its title”). 
 74. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th 
Cir. 1971). 
 75. Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes 
à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 788 
(2006). 
 76. Russell Hasan, Copyright’s Merger Doctrine as a Solution to Conflicts 
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expressions from being monopolized by the authors who would 
copyright those limited expressions first.77 For example, in Her-
bert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the idea and expressions of a “jeweled bee pin” are 
equivalent, noting that any similarities between different jew-
eled bee pins are simply a result of them being jeweled bee 
pins.78 When a court determines that few expressions are avail-
able to an idea, the merger doctrine applies and the court need 
not wait for all possible expressions to be copyrighted.79 Thus, 
an expression can maintain copyright, but not if it is one of lim-
ited ways to express an idea. 
Voluntary consensus standards meet the statutory re-
quirements for copyright protection. There is no question of the 
independent creativity involved in authoring a standard.80 Fur-
ther, any voluntary consensus standard is just one of seemingly 
infinite ways in which to express the idea of a safety code so 
there is no merger issue involved.81 On its own, a voluntary 
consensus standard is indeed a copyright protected work. 
2. Rights of Copyright Owners 
The owner of a copyright is given exclusive power to control 
the reproduction, derivation, and distribution of that copyright-
ed work.82 For SDOs developing voluntary consensus standards, 
these rights last for either 120 years after creation of the 
standard or 95 years after the standard’s first publication, 
whichever comes first.83 Anyone who violates one of these rights 
 
Between Copyright Law and Freedom of Speech, CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J., 
http://www.cardozoaelj.com/hasan_blog (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). 
 77. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 
1967). 
 78. See Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742 (“There is no greater similarity be-
tween the pins of plaintiff and defendants than is inevitable from the use of 
jewel-encrusted bee forms in both.”). 
 79. See Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 679 (“[Merger doctrine’s] operation need 
not await an attempt to copyright all possible forms.”). 
 80. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (“As the organizational author of original works, SBCCI indis-
putably holds a copyright in its model building codes.”). 
 81. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (E.D. 
Tex. 1999) (“[T]he subject of building codes is open to a number of different 
types of expressions.”). 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3) (2012). 
 83. Id. § 302(c) (explaining the duration of copyright on works made for 
hire). 
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is guilty of copyright infringement.84 A derivative work is one 
that is based upon another, such as a translation or dramatiza-
tion.85 Since incorporation by reference deals with a single es-
tablished version of a standard, derivative rights do not arise 
when SDO rights are violated. Reproduction and distribution 
are the most relevant rights in this context. 
The reproduction right is the bedrock of the copyright own-
er’s power.86 Generally, the reproduction right prohibits anyone 
from copying the protected aspects of a work into another fixed 
copy.87 There are different degrees of copying. The most 
straightforward type is the exact copy, whereby a substantial 
portion of protected elements are simply duplicated.88 This of-
ten occurs in cases dealing with photography,89 literature,90 or 
music.91 A total duplication of a work consisting of non-
protected elements still represents unlawful reproduction.92 On 
the opposite end is the de minimis copy—one “so trivial that 
the law will not impose legal consequences.”93 
 
 84. See id. § 501(a). But see Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Re-
gents, 633 F.3d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that the states still 
possess sovereign immunity in the realm of copyright infringement violations). 
 85. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “derivative work”). 
 86. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION 
ECONOMY 248 (4th ed. 2015). 
 87. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 
(1985) (“[C]opyright does not prevent . . . copying . . . those constituent ele-
ments that are not original . . . as long as such use does not unfairly appropri-
ate the author’s original contributions.”). 
 88. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
464 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[A] copyrighted work would be in-
fringed by reproducing it in whole or in any substantial part, and by duplicat-
ing it exactly . . . .” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976))). 
 89. See, e.g., Images Audio Visual Prods., Inc. v. Perini Bldg Co., 91 F. 
Supp. 2d 1075, 1079–80 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (duplicating copyrighted commer-
cial construction photographs infringed the photograph owner’s right of repro-
duction). 
 90. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 
1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding a printing company infringed the copy-
right of academic articles when it wholesale-copied substantial excerpts from 
the articles into topical classroom packets). 
 91. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14 
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting that computer users that download and upload copy-
righted songs infringe the owner’s reproduction rights to both the musical 
composition and the sound recording). 
 92. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (“A verbatim reproduction of another work . . . even in the realm of 
nonfiction, is actionable as copyright infringement.”). 
 93. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
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Copyright would serve little purpose if it were limited to 
complete duplication. Thus reproduction rights also prevent 
copies that make use of only some protected elements.94 These 
are called substantially similar copies and they infringe upon 
protected elements but do so with less obvious copying.95 The 
various types of copying illustrate how a reproduction right can 
extend broadly to prohibit many similar copies. In the context 
of voluntary consensus standards, reproduction of an incorpo-
rated standard makes for an easy infringement action. Because 
citizens need to know the exact terms of a legal obligation, in-
fringement usually involves duplicating the entire standard 
and not just portions of it. 
In addition to reproduction, SDOs have the exclusive right 
of distribution. The distribution right protects against dissemi-
nating unauthorized copies of the protected work “to the public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending.”96 Although reproduction and distribution often impli-
cate each other when infringement is involved, distribution is a 
distinct action.97 This provides copyright owners with more op-
tions for control. The threat of distribution infringement has a 
suffocating effect on the availability of incorporated standards 
that are outside of the SDO’s direct sales. It prevents commer-
cial legal publishers, for example, from ever taking the initia-
tive to compile incorporated standards and sell them as a vol-
ume, despite the obvious market for such a product.98 
As noted above, these rights are not absolute and are sub-
ject to a variety of exceptions. The most famous exception is fair 
use.99 Fair use is a statutory affirmative defense to copyright 
infringement, permitting a user to infringe the rights of a copy-
 
 94. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 257–58 (discussing the concept of 
the substantially similar copy). 
 95. See, e.g., Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 
1076–81 (9th Cir. 2006) (analyzing similarity between, inter alia, plots, char-
acter developments, themes, and dialogue of two different television show 
scripts). 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
 97. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 346 (noting the “hand in hand” 
nature of reproduction and distribution). 
 98. Perhaps the easiest example to provide here is Thomson Reuters. Ar-
guably the market leader in selling consolidated legal resources, the company 
does not sell any product that consolidates all incorporated regulations. In-
stead, to distribute voluntary consensus standards they operate a website that 
merely serves as a retail outlet for proprietary SDO publications. See TECH 
STREET, http://www.techstreet.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). 
 99. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 563. 
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right holder “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”100 Fair use rep-
resents a principle that an informed society requires using cop-
yrighted materials to communicate.101 The Copyright Code sets 
out four non-exhaustive factors that a court must weigh when 
determining if a fair use has occurred. The first factor is “the 
purpose and character of the use.”102 This factor considers 
whether the use “transforms” or adds something new to the 
copyrighted work, such as reproducing books into a digital form 
to enable computer searches for single words.103 The second fac-
tor is “the nature of the copyrighted work.”104 This evaluates the 
characteristics of the original work. For example, copying a fac-
tual work is more allowable than a fictional work.105 The third 
factor is “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the [original] copyrighted work as a whole.”106 This 
includes both quantity and quality of the used portions.107 Last-
ly, courts must consider “the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”108 The potential 
market includes both the effects of that specific use, and the 
adverse effects which would occur if use were widespread.109 
Despite this guidance, fair use practicality suffers. First, it 
is so factually circumstantial that it offers very little predicta-
bility for anyone using a copyrighted expression.110 This is prob-
 
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 101. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 564–65 (noting that some of the 
most important topics of discourse require balancing usage of a copyrighted 
work with the copyright owner’s interests). 
 102. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 103. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214–19 (2d Cir. 
2015) (discussing analysis that shows digital reproductions of books for the 
purpose of searching words and phrases contained within is a new purpose 
and character). 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 105. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nat’l Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 
(1985) (“The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual 
works than works of fiction or fantasy.”). 
 106. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 107. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710–11 (2d Cir. 2013) (analyzing 
whether an artist’s dark, gothic alterations to a photographer’s scientific doc-
umentary photographs retained too much of the original photograph as to be 
substantial). 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 109. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590–94 (1994) 
(discussing the potential market effects that a parody song has on the original 
on which it is based). 
 110. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 
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lematic because communication sometimes requires using cop-
yrighted expressions. Fair use forces a user to balance the need 
to use the expression with the risk of committing infringe-
ment.111 This reveals the second concern: fair use is only applied 
as a defense to infringement. Unlike usage of facts and ideas, 
which by themselves cannot be infringed, a use must be litigat-
ed before knowing whether the exception applies. As discussed 
in Part II, fair use may not always apply to reproduction and 
distribution of incorporated standards. 
C. HOW COPYRIGHT APPLIES TO LAWS 
It is a well-established rule that laws cannot be copyright-
ed. This rule is reflected in a variety of ways at the federal lev-
el. For example, the Copyright Code expressly denies protection 
for any work of the United States Government.112 Similarly, the 
U.S. Copyright Office will not register a copyright in any legis-
lation, judicial opinion, agency regulation, or work that has the 
force of law.113 But this rule is insufficient by itself for solving 
the problem posed above. Incorporated standards are not works 
of the United States and the Copyright Office does not promul-
gate binding rules.114 The Copyright Code itself is actually en-
tirely silent on how copyright applies to laws. Instead, the rule 
arose from a pair of Supreme Court cases over one hundred 
years ago. 
The rule originates from 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters, which 
held that judicial opinions cannot be copyrighted.115 In that 
 
(2007); see also Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 
132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that amount and substantiality analysis must 
be conducted not just by itself but within the context of purpose and use as 
well). 
 111. See id. at 1096 (noting the potential for “high costs of litigation and 
the potentially enormous statutory damages” if a court disagrees with a user’s 
fair use judgement). 
 112. 17 U.S.C. § 105. 
 113. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES § 313.6(C)(1)–(2) (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. 
 114. See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 
2016) (“[A]n opinion expressed by the Copyright Office . . . does not receive 
Chevron deference of the sort accorded to rulemaking by authorized agencies 
. . . .”). 
 115. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834) (“[T]he court [sic] are 
unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the 
written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot 
confer on any reporter any such right.”). 
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case, an early Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions116 sued his 
successor for copyright infringement when the successor repub-
lished court opinions originally issued and published during the 
plaintiff ’s tenure.117 The Supreme Court did not give any rea-
soning for that holding, however. The Court later provided rea-
soning for the rule that judicial opinions could not be copy-
righted in Banks v. Manchester. In Banks, an Ohio Supreme 
Court reporter alleged copyright infringement against a third-
party publisher for copying two opinions from the reporter’s of-
ficial publications.118 The Banks Court reaffirmed Wheaton, and 
finally clarified the holding by stating that “[t]he whole work 
done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and in-
terpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for 
publication to all . . . .”119 The Court further explained that 
judges, in their official capacities, are outside of copyright’s 
purpose, since judges earn “a stated annual salary, fixed by 
law, and can themselves have no pecuniary interest or proprie-
torship, as against the public at large, in the fruits of their ju-
dicial labors.”120 
Since then courts have applied a broader rule from the rea-
soning that laws in any form—statute, regulation, or judicial 
opinion—are not eligible for copyright.121 And up until now, 
there has been little controversy about the copyright ineligibil-
ity of laws. The case law since Banks firmly establishes the ex-
isting broader rule that laws in all forms are not subject to cop-
yright for two reasons. The first is policy (needing to know laws 
one is bound to), and the second is incentive (the laws are writ-
ten by individuals whose public duty is to write them sans in-
centive). As discussed below in Part II, however, the fusion of 
 
 116. The Reporter of Decisions is the editor tasked with preparing Su-
preme Court opinions for publication in the United States Reports. See SUP. 
CT. R. 41. 
 117. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 593–95. 
 118. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 247–50 (1888). 
 119. Id. at 253–54 (emphasis added) (citing Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 
560 (Mass. 1886)). 
 120. Id. at 253; see also, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 
121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he public owns the opinions because it 
pays the judges’ salaries.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs. V. Code Tech, Inc., 628 F.2d 
730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[J]udicial opinions and statutes are in the public do-
main and are not subject to copyright.”); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th 
Cir. 1898) (“[N]o one can obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of a 
state . . . .”); Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1982) 
(“[N]either judicial opinions nor statutes can be copyrighted.”). 
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traditional law-making with private standard authorship to 
create legal obligations does not fit neatly into this analysis. 
The functioning of incorporation by reference, combined with 
the silence of copyright statutes on the eligibility of laws, cre-
ates legitimate concerns that remain unanswered about wheth-
er incorporated copyrighted works should continue to be pro-
tected by copyright. 
Although laws cannot be copyrighted, incorporated stand-
ards are copyrightable because they are original works of au-
thorship. Authors of voluntary consensus standards can claim 
exclusive rights in the standard under § 106 of the Copyright 
Code.122 Then, when an agency incorporates the standard into 
law, it must respect the copyright of the SDO.123 This prevents 
the agency from infringing the SDO’s reproduction or distribu-
tion rights in any way, and permits the SDO to capitalize on its 
placement in law.124 The Copyright Office will not acknowledge 
a copyright in works that have legal force,125 but by this point 
the SDO will have already obtained its copyright. There is no 
statutory provision revoking or limiting a work’s copyright it 
after it is enacted into law. 
II.  COPYRIGHT LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE A SOLUTION 
FOR ENABLING ACCESS TO VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS 
STANDARDS INCORPORATED INTO LAW   
Copyright does not provide a solution that makes incorpo-
rated standards unconditionally accessible to the public. There 
are two reasons for this: (1) the copyright code does not address 
how copyright applies to laws; (2) incorporated standards are 
actual copyrighted works, confusing the analysis that would 
 
 122. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (“As the organizational author of original works, SBCCI indis-
putably holds a copyright in its model building codes.”). But see Int’l Code 
Council, Inc., v. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, Inc., No. 02 C 5610, 2006 WL 850879, at 
*23 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“[G]enuine material disputes of fact exist as to whether 
Plaintiff owns, by operation of the work-for-hire doctrine with respect to the 
acts of authorship by the technical subcommittee members or ICC staff liai-
sons, many of the allegedly infringed provisions in the IBC 2000.”). 
 123. OMB Circular No. A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8555, § 6( j ) (Feb. 19, 
1998). 
 124. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 743 (noting that 
SDOs retain an entitlement to charge for access to their copyrighted materi-
als); Mendelson, Taking Public Access, supra note 8, at 10778 & n.26 (noting 
that executive order draft revisions are silent on SDO access fees). 
 125. COMPENDIUM, supra note 113 (describing, as examples of works with 
legal force, statutes, regulations, judicial opinions, and edicts of government). 
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otherwise apply to traditional laws. This Part will examine 
whether copyright’s other doctrines can adequately protect ac-
cess to incorporated standards despite the statute failing to 
specifically address copyright of laws in general. This Note con-
cludes that they cannot. Section A explains how the Supreme 
Court’s Banks analysis does not cleanly apply to incorporated 
standards. Section B examines whether a law can be a fact or 
idea for copyright purposes and how that may apply to incorpo-
rated standards. Finally, Section C shows how fair use fails to 
provide a last-resort solution for protecting use of incorporated 
standards. 
A. THE RULE IN BANKS DOES NOT APPLY TO INCORPORATED 
STANDARDS 
The broader Banks rule teaches that traditional laws are 
not eligible for copyright because they need to be accessed 
freely by the public and their author’s public duties are not 
within the incentivizing purpose of copyright. First, incorpo-
rated standards are distinguished from traditional laws by the 
incentivized purpose of their authors. The Banks rule only ana-
lyzes laws that are written by lawmakers in their official capac-
ities and ignores circumstances like incorporation by reference 
where laws are initially authored by private parties. The deci-
sion in Banks turned on the incentive of the author: the Court 
found judicial opinions could not be copyrighted because the 
public duty of judges to draft opinions is outside the purpose of 
copyright law—to cultivate future works for the benefit of soci-
ety by providing authors with an incentive to create them.126 
Thus, lawmakers draft laws because it is their public duty and 
the Supreme Court does not recognize that duty as being with-
in the scope of copyright’s incentivizing purpose.127 
While traditional laws therefore cannot be copyrighted, in-
corporated standards can still maintain copyright because SDO 
authorship is within copyright’s incentivizing purpose.128 As 
 
 126. See generally Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) (noting the 
word “incentive” does not appear in the opinion). 
 127. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 796 (noting the SBCCI argument regarding 
judge economic incentives); Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs. v. Code Tech., Inc., 
628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980) (“BOCA’s argument implies that the rule of 
Wheaton v. Peters was based on the public’s property interest in work pro-
duced by legislators and judges, who are, of course, government employees.”). 
 128. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 796 (noting the SBCCI argument that private 
authors have different interests than government employees); Bldg. Officials 
& Code Adm’rs., 628 F.2d at 734 (“BOCA argues that [their code], unlike judi-
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mentioned previously, it is only after the SDOs receive copy-
right that the standards become incorporated into law. Because 
the Banks reasoning relies on the authorship incentive pur-
pose, incorporated standards will be able to maintain copyright 
under the current Copyright Code, placing them outside of 
Banks even after the standards become incorporated. 
This after-the-fact legal effect indicates the second reason 
Banks cannot apply: SDOs do not claim copyright over the ac-
tual law, but something the law refers to. Banks involved an at-
tempt to copyright a judicially drafted legal opinion, which is 
significantly different from a voluntary consensus standard. 
The SDOs do not draft legally binding materials—they draft 
copyrighted works that later become referenced by a law that 
lawmakers author. Thus, the SDO is not claiming copyright 
over the actual law that references its standard. It is claiming 
copyright over the standard that exists regardless of any law-
maker’s decision to incorporate it into law. If the SDO attempt-
ed to claim copyright over the law itself, surely it would be de-
nied. Additionally, such a claim would be redundant because 
the text of the standard is not included in the law. So the SDO 
would be claiming copyright over a law that simply contains a 
single sentence reference to the author’s own code. In other 
words, there is no need for a copyright claim over the law itself 
referencing the standard because the SDO already has a copy-
right over the part that matters. This would not change even if 
the concept of “law ownership” was broad and more abstract, 
such as society owning the laws instead of the lawmaker that 
literally drafted it.129 
Therefore, under Banks, SDOs have a valid copyright in 
their incorporated standards because the standards were pri-
vately authored within the incentivizing scope of copyright de-
spite their subsequent legal effect. Additionally, the claim is 
not over an enacted law, but a work the law refers to. Strictly 
applying the Banks principle, SDOs are within their rights to 
protect their copyright interest. Practically, however, this out-
come is what the Banks Court was trying to prevent—citizens 
 
cial opinions and statutes, is principally the work . . . of itself-a private organi-
zation operating with little or no government support . . . .”). 
 129. See, e.g., Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs., 628 F.2d at 734 (“[C]itizens 
are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually 
drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of 
the public . . . .”). 
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will not have free access to their legal obligations.130 This ex-
poses the inadequacy of the current common law approach and 
suggests a need for a new solution. 
B. LAWS AS FACTS AND IDEAS 
Facts are not eligible for copyright and limited expressions 
of an idea will be precluded from protection. While it seems in-
tuitive that a law is an idea with a limited expression, this 
premise fails when the expression of a law may be arbitrarily 
designated as anything. Similarly, an existing law has a factual 
element to it. But copyright’s non-protective treatment of facts 
hinges on their lack of originality. Voluntary consensus stand-
ards are undeniably original works, which contradicts any fact 
analysis. Even though the mechanics of ideas, expressions, and 
facts can easily be applied to a voluntary consensus standard 
and the separate law that references it, the same familiar is-
sues surface from Part II.A: an incorporated standard is not a 
traditional law and the arbitrary way that it receives legal 
force does not transform it so either. Subsection 1 examines 
whether laws can be analyzed as facts. Subsection 2 evaluates 
whether a law is an idea and how the expression of an incorpo-
rated standard should be analyzed against the law referencing 
it. 
1. Laws as Facts 
For copyright purposes, the Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly held that laws are facts. The Court has explained that 
the essence of a fact is that it is not original to any author, but 
rather is something to be discovered.131 Under this reasoning a 
law could be considered a fact. The Copyright Code is, for ex-
ample, a factual thing that exists to be discovered by someone. 
But this reasoning begins to break down in the context of any-
thing that actually originated in an incentivized author because 
whether something is discovered is a matter of perspective. For 
example, Prince wrote, produced, and performed the entirety of 
his album 1999 all by himself.132 To anyone who is not Prince, 
 
 130. See Banks, 128 U.S. at 253 (“[T]he law, which, binding every citizen, is 
free for publication to all . . . .”). 
 131. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991). 
 132. See Joey DeGroot, Seven Great Albums Recorded by One Person: 
Prince, Paul McCartney, and More, MUSIC TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www 
  
1354 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1331 
 
1999 would be a factual thing to be discovered (perhaps in a 
record store). To Prince, 1999 was not discovered, because it 
originated from his efforts. Analyzing 1999 as a fact would then 
allow anyone who is not Prince to make use of 1999 without re-
striction—clearly violating Prince’s exclusive rights to 1999. 
Thus, analyzing any original work as a fact leads to a contra-
dictory result. The act of Prince creating 1999 was a factual 
event that occurred, which may be reproduced, distributed, or 
translated into a derivative. The album itself is not. This ap-
plies to an incorporated standard as well. Anyone who is not 
the SDO author would be discovering the standard. 
The laws-as-facts analysis has seen some success in courts, 
but the outcomes still provide little guidance for incorporated 
standards. For example, in Veeck v. Southern Building Code 
Congress International, the majority held laws must be factual 
because they cannot be stated in any other language than that 
which is expressed in the law.133 One could argue under this 
reasoning that incorporated standards are facts because they 
can only be stated the way the SDOs have written them. The 
court’s reasoning is questionable, however, because it mistakes 
the essence of a fact. Facts are not determined by whether they 
can be stated differently—John F. Kennedy was assassinated; 
A man murdered President John F. Kennedy—they are deter-
mined by lack of origin in an author. John F. Kennedy’s assas-
sination is a fact that originated in no one, no matter how many 
different ways it can be stated. 
After accepting that laws are facts, the Veeck majority does 
not explain what legally causes a copyrighted standard to be-
come a single unprotectable fact. In that case, the SDO did not 
author the laws of a city, it authored several safety standards 
that became incorporated.134 The majority avoids explaining 
this standard-into-fact transformation by instead bizarrely 
holding that the copyright held on the standard is not entirely 
unprotected: if a would-be infringer reproduces or distributes 
the standard as the law, the laws-as-facts analysis applies and 
the SDO cannot enforce infringement claims because it cannot 
 
.musictimes.com/articles/5280/20140406/seven-great-albums-recorded-by-one 
-person-prince-paul-mccartney-and-more.htm. 
 133. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 801 (quoting Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 
Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 416 (5th Cir. 2001) (Little, J., dissenting)). 
 134. See id. at 793–94 (noting that SBCCI’s Standard Gas Code, Standard 
Fire Prevention Code, and Standard Mechanical Code were at issue in the 
case). 
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control a fact; but if someone uses the standard as a model code 
the SDO may exert control over the use.135 But what is the dif-
ference between these two uses? There could be no way to know 
if the source that was copied from was the copyrighted work or 
the law when both are identical.136 There is no use or value to a 
copyright if an exact replica of the protected work exists simul-
taneously as an unprotected fact that may be wholesale repro-
duced and distributed by anyone. 
And even if this bi-usage rationale was accepted and it pre-
cluded a copyright infringement claim for reproducing or pub-
lishing a standard as law, it does not solve the problem of SDOs 
controlling access to the public’s legal obligations by charging 
access fees when law seekers are forced to obtain it from them. 
2. Laws as Ideas 
Now an analysis of whether a law is an idea with a limited 
number of expressions. Recall that the merger doctrine re-
quires a difficult analysis of competing interests before an idea 
and expression are merged. To begin with, there are multiple 
ways to express model codes and simply enacting one into law 
does not render it any less than one of many ways to express a 
building code.137 However, using a law as the idea that an ex-
pression is analyzed against (instead of the original idea it was 
authored under, i.e., a safety code) requires distorting merger 
doctrine analysis that cannot be accepted. 
Under normal merger doctrine analysis, the copyright eli-
gibility of a standard would be determined by analyzing the 
standard as a single expression of a model code (the idea). 
Then, the court would weigh whether SDO interests (economic 
incentive) outweigh the public’s interest (only way to express 
the idea of a model code) before deciding whether the expres-
 
 135. See id. at 800 (“[W]e hold that when Veeck copied only ‘the law’ of An-
na and Savoy, Texas, which he obtained from SBCCI’s publication, and when 
he reprinted only ‘the law’ of those municipalities, he did not infringe . . . .”). 
 136. This dilemma brings to mind Judge Learned Hand’s famous inde-
pendent creation hypothetical: “[I]f by some magic a man who had never 
known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 
‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though 
they might of course copy Keats’s.” Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 
81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). The same trouble surfaces: duplicate copies exist 
as both protected and in the public domain only by magic. 
 137. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 807 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“A complex 
code, even a simple one, can be expressed in a variety of ways.”); Veeck v. S. 
Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (E.D. Tex. 1999). 
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sion should be merged and therefore unprotected. Since the 
standard is one of infinite ways to express a model code, there 
is no public interest to merge the expression with the idea and 
the standard would retain its copyright. 
But this is not the question under laws as ideas analysis. 
Instead, the law-as-idea context is asking whether a specific 
wording or expression is the only way to express a particular 
law. For example, is the text of the Eighth Amendment the only 
way to express the Eighth Amendment? The answer would 
have to be yes. But the amendment’s text could be a replica of 
anything the lawmakers want it to be—Anna Karenina, The 
Raven, or a George Carlin joke—linking those expressions to an 
idea it would never be analyzed against under standard merger 
analysis, which poses a problem for practice. Consider a real 
world possibility: a person drafts a philosophical text on ethics 
and morals. In the broadest abstract, this author’s work would 
be one possible way to express the idea of “how to behave.” The 
day after its publication, Congress enacts it as Title 57 of the 
United States Code, nullifying its copyright because it is the 
only way to express the idea of Title 57. But the author didn’t 
create an expression of Title 57. The expression itself is being 
declared an idea, simply by choosing it to be so.138 This com-
pletely goes against merger doctrine analysis, which requires 
an expression to be analyzed in light of the idea it was au-
thored under. The whole purpose of merger vanishes when a 
copyrighted expression is compared to arbitrary ideas that have 
no relation to its essence. 
The merger doctrine does not change a copyrighted expres-
sion into the sole unprotected expression of an entirely unrelat-
ed idea by simply incorporating it into law and declaring it to 
be “merged” with an arbitrarily chosen idea. Likewise, there 
are practical problems with declaring original works to be facts. 
These fundamentals of copyright analysis do not change just 
because a standard is incorporated and given legal effect. 
C. FAIR USE AS A LAST DEFENSE 
Since the previous Sections have shown that voluntary 
consensus standards retain their copyrights when incorporated, 
it is important to determine if a fair use defense can safely pro-
vide the public with access to incorporated standards. This Sec-
 
 138. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 807 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“[T]he rea-
soning is wholly tautological.”). 
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tion will address whether fair use is an appropriate solution to 
preserve the public’s use of incorporated standards.139 Though 
fair use looks like a reasonable option because it protects many 
uses in which the text of an incorporated standard would be re-
produced, it ultimately fails because it cannot protect a usage 
that seeks to simply spread information. 
To begin, fair use is not an ideal solution procedurally be-
cause, even if it applies, it would require costly litigation, which 
would undermine goals of improving access. Fair use is a de-
fense to established infringement, meaning any user would 
have to establish in court that the exception applies. And be-
cause SDOs would initiate the litigation, they have complete 
control to determine strategically when to bring infringement 
actions.140 This is not merely a hypothetical: selective copyright 
enforcement is a known strategy among owners of copyright to 
manipulate the value of their works.141 The cost and time-
consuming nature of lawsuits, combined with SDO’s discretion 
of when to bring suits, illustrates how even an effective fair use 
claim does not provide optimum access for the public. Repro-
ducing or distributing a legal obligation ought to not require de-
fending a copyright infringement suit, especially given the un-
predictable nature of asserting the defense. 
Substantively, a user of an incorporated standard has an 
uncomfortably probable chance of failing a fair use analysis 
given the nature of how laws are communicated. It would be 
difficult to use incorporated standards in a different way. Legal 
writing and analysis often must reproduce the text of laws and 
opinions verbatim in order to be effective.142 It would not be use-
ful for purposes of teaching, information, or analysis if the ex-
act text could not be used. Similarly, judicial statutory inter-
pretation standards first seek to derive plain meaning from the 
 
 139. But see Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806–07 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); id. 
at 817 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“[F]air use . . . [is] more than adequate to pre-
serve the ability of residents . . . to copy any portions of the code that they 
want or need to view.”). 
 140. See id. at 800 (“Free availability of the law, by this logic, has degener-
ated into availability as long as [SDOs] choose[ ] not to file suit.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Sean Kirkpatrick, Comment, Like Holding a Bird: What the 
Prevalence of Fansubbing Can Teach Us About the Use of Strategic Selective 
Copyright Enforcement, 21 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 131, 133–34 (2003) 
(analyzing the market strategy of Japanese corporations to withhold aggres-
sive copyright infringement litigation schemes against fan bases). 
 142. See Collyn A. Peddie, The Ten Commandments of Legal Writing, 
HOUS. LAW., July/Aug. 1994, at 36, 40–41 (noting legal communication re-
quires clearly knowing and understanding the law). 
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literal text of a law.143 This would be a futile task without the 
exact text. It is therefore crucial to use the exact words of a law 
when communicating it. Unfortunately, replication is often not 
treated positively by the third factor of fair use analysis, the 
amount and substantiality, unless the use is different and 
transformative. 
Replication is only part of the analysis, however. Simply 
being within one of the expressed purposes of the fair use stat-
ute does not automatically protect the usage.144 But if the pur-
pose does fall within one of those purposes, like criticism, teach-
ing, or research, duplicating text may be more forgivable even if 
the entire work is reproduced.145 The nature of the copyrighted 
work factor would further support a fair use finding since in-
corporated standards are informational and copying of informa-
tional works is more likely to be found in favor of fair use.146 
Lastly, the market effect factor for these uses would support fair 
use for two reasons: (1) incorporated standards and works cri-
tiquing them serve different markets and it is unlikely that an 
SDO would simultaneously offer works that criticize its own 
product; and (2) the negative market effects of effective criti-
cism are not a recognized harm under copyright law.147 Thus, 
copying substantial portions of an incorporated standard for 
critical or annotated educational purposes would have a very 
strong presumption of fair use, thereby protecting public ac-
cess. But this list of purposes is not exhaustive, and there is 
one remaining purpose that poses a significant problem—the 
informational purpose. 
Anyone desiring to read a law is likely to seek a source that 
contains the law in its entirety, because of the importance of 
exact wording. Recalling the different markets described above, 
a person seeking to read a work would not seek out a criticism 
 
 143. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (noting that the first 
step of statutory construction is to “determine whether the statutory text is 
plain and unambiguous”). 
 144. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994) 
(describing the fair use categories as illustrative to analysis). 
 145. E.g., Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 714 (W.D. Va. 2014) (ac-
knowledging that courts widely accept reproducing a protected work in its en-
tirety for criticism and opinion). 
 146. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 
152, 157–58 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding books on L. Ron Hubbard’s life, religion, 
and family were factual in nature and permitted greater leniency for copying). 
 147. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (discussing the market effects of 
parody music on a song and its derivatives). 
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of that work as a substitute. In the law publishing context, 
then, there is absolutely a need for sources that that simply 
display the unaltered law free of criticism or annotations.148 But 
this “informational” purpose for reproducing incorporated 
standards is far less likely to be considered fair use in compari-
son to the statutory transformational purposes. 
Recall that the first factor, purpose, evaluates whether the 
use supersedes the original work or adds something new, and 
whether the use is commercial or non-profit educational.149 This 
is problematic from the start because an informational purpose 
does not fit cleanly into any of the statute’s transformation cat-
egories, nor is it commercial or non-profit educational—it is 
just to spread information. A non-transformative purpose does 
not bar a finding of fair use, but it severely hamstrings the like-
lihood of fair use by damaging the context that the other factors 
are considered in.150 Such as the amount and substantiality fac-
tor: while wholesale copying would probably be acceptable un-
der a criticism purpose, under a non-transformative purpose, 
wholesale copying goes directly against fair use.151 Under the 
market effect factor, a non-transformative use either directly 
usurps the market of the original work by competing against its 
replica, or destroys the market entirely where the reproduc-
tions are given away for free (as is likely with spreading infor-
mation).152 All of these factors taken together provide a gloomy 
projection for an informational purpose. 
Failure to protect an informational purpose is the deal 
breaker. While fair use may be adequate where usage is for 
 
 148. See, e.g., THOMSON REUTERS ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 9 (2016) (not-
ing that, in 2015 alone, the Thomson West Legal Services Division earned $3.4 
billion in revenue). 
 149. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79 (noting the evaluation of purpose 
and use); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (requiring evaluation of the “pur-
pose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes”). 
 150. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 
1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“In the context of non-transformative us-
es, at least, and except insofar as they touch on the [market] fourth factor, the 
other statutory factors seem considerably less important.”). 
 151. E.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 311 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“Unless the use is transformative, the use of a copyrighted work in its 
entirety will normally weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
 152. E.g., Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 
1242 (D. Colo. 2006) (reselling unauthorized “clean” films was a non-
transformative use that usurped a market copyright owners were entitled to 
engage). 
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criticism and the like, if the fair use defense cannot protect 
something like a non-profit informational website for simply 
displaying the text of an incorporated standard, then it cannot 
be sufficient to protect the public’s access. A partial access to 
law, in hopes of gambling a satisfactory fair use defense to cop-
yright infringement, does not correspond with the public’s need 
to access the laws that govern it. Finally, even while fair use 
may provide an opportunity for reproducing the text of an in-
corporated standard in many uses, it does not resolve the issue 
of paying to obtain the standard. 
III.  HOW COPYRIGHT CAN BE CHANGED TO PROTECT 
ACCESS TO INCORPORATED VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS 
STANDARDS   
Revising the Copyright Code will be necessary to allow in-
corporated standards to be obtained without cost, and be free 
for reproduction and distribution. These changes will inevitably 
affect how standard industries operate, but they will not impair 
their ability to maintain competitiveness and accrue substan-
tial revenue. This Part discusses how copyright law should be 
changed. First, Section A proposes finally adding laws to the 
§ 102 subject matter statute. Then Section B introduces consid-
erations for copyrighted works that voluntarily receive subse-
quent legal effect. Finally, Section C raises and defends the 
economic and incentive implications for altering the copyright 
of incorporated standards. 
A. ADDING LAWS TO § 102 
Despite the extensive history of denying copyright in laws, 
the Copyright Code does not address the copyright eligibility of 
laws leaving enforcement of this longstanding rule vulnerable 
and unclear. The Copyright Office will reject registrations of 
materials with legal effect, but they are not policy makers nor 
do they write or bindingly interpret the statutes.153 Courts have 
 
 153. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 113 (denying copyright in state and fed-
eral statutes, judicial opinions, and regulations). In addition, the behavior of 
the Copyright Office indicates that it should not be relied upon to side on the 
interest of the public when rights holder’s interests are at stake. The Copy-
right Office has a troubling pattern of blatantly misinterpreting and misapply-
ing copyright statutes to expand the power of copyright holders, injecting its 
pro-rights holder’s opinions into policy topics beyond its place or expertise, and 
courts repeatedly ignoring or rejecting its opinions as contrary to the statutes. 
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repeatedly found that laws should not be copyrightable. But de-
spite the consensus in case law, the subject of copyrighted laws 
continues to surface in unorthodox cases, often where new 
technology or third party/private organizations are involved 
with the drafting process.154 These create factual circumstances 
that do not fit cleanly into the case law. 
Legislation is required to ensure laws and materials with 
legal effect are not subject to copyright for all circumstances. 
Congress should therefore add laws to the § 102(b) general sub-
ject matter exclusions.155 Doing so would be consistent with how 
copyright law developed. Much of the prohibited subject matter 
in § 102(b) first developed in case law and was later written in-
to the statute by lawmakers.156 The case precedent of denying 
copyright protection to laws is extensive enough to represent a 
judicial consensus that laws cannot be copyrighted, thus mak-
ing it ripe for inclusion into § 102(b).157 In addition, this would 
be in line with congressional intent. A Senate report for the 
Copyright Act stated the purpose of § 102(b) was to codify al-
ready-established doctrines of ideas and concepts.158 Codifying 
the long-standing consensus on copyright eligibility of laws 
would bolster that purpose. 
Adding laws to § 102(b) finally establishes that laws and 
materials with legal effect are unrestricted and free for the 
 
See generally PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, CAPTURED: SYSTEMIC BIAS AT THE UNITED 
STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE 1–2 (2016). 
 154. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 708 
(2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the effect of “star pagination” on digital copies of 
court opinions); Complaint, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, 
Inc., No. 1:15-cv-02594-MHC (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2015) (alleging that annota-
tions of a state code are copyrightable where state declares annotated version 
to be the official state code). 
 155. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (2016). 
 156. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 86, at 90–91 (“[L]egislative history 
. . . indicates that Congress intended §102(b) in part to codify the holding of 
Baker.”). 
 157. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“The whole work 
done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of 
the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” (emphasis 
added)); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834) (“[N]o reporter . . . can 
have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court . . . .”); How-
ell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898) (“[N]o one can obtain the exclusive 
right to publish the laws of a state . . . .”); Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. 
Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (“[T]his court holds that a state may not copy-
right its statutes.”). 
 158. See S. REP. NO. 93-983, at 108 (1974) (“Its purpose is to restate, in the 
context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy 
between expression and idea remains unchanged.”). 
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public’s use. As technology and practices like incorporation by 
reference evolve, they will continue to push the boundaries of 
what may be copyrighted. Only a statutory solution that re-
solves the issue outright protects access to laws under novel 
circumstances. By adding laws to § 102(b), Congress removes 
the possibility that any laws or materials with legal effect can 
be subject to exclusive control. 
B. FOR COPYRIGHTED WORKS SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN LEGAL 
FORCE 
Simply adding laws to § 102(b), however, is not enough to 
remedy this issue by itself because it does not change the fact 
that a valid copyright exists in incorporated standards. The 
best approach would be to treat any copyrighted work as free of 
control the moment it is given legal effect. Incorporated stand-
ards are distinguishable from other privately developed works 
that receive legal effect, like the Model Penal Code (MPC), in 
that they are meant to be concealed from publication, some-
times spawn copyright infringement litigation, and require the 
public to spend significantly to obtain.159 The MPC and state 
statutes that adopt portions of it are publicly distributed, thus 
there is no gateway allowing the MPC authors to exercise con-
trol. Thus, while adding laws to § 102(b) may prevent controls 
like infringement lawsuits, SDOs may still continue to control 
access to their hidden incorporated standards with fees because 
they are the only source for obtaining them. Additional reform 
is therefore needed to fully address the problem. 
This Note suggests that Congress create a provision specif-
ically altering the copyright of a protected work that has been 
given legal force, by assigning that work to the public do-
main.160 A copyright owner cannot be forced by the government 
to distribute or share their copyrighted work.161 Voluntary con-
 
 159. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012) (“[M]atter reasonably available to the 
class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register 
when incorporated by reference . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 160. Cf. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 127 (statement of Rep. Darrell 
Issa) (“[I]f I am willing to have [my standard] released to everyone, as an own-
er of that copyright and an undivided owner, don’t [I] ultimately have no pos-
sibility of protection?”). 
 161. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2012) (noting involuntary transfer orders by 
government are generally prohibited); see also Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. 
Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he United States copyright of 
an individual author shall be secured to that author, and cannot be taken 
away by any involuntary transfer.”). 
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sensus standards enacted into law are not done under a “tak-
ings clause,” but rather are voluntarily offered by their SDOs.162 
A copyright holder always has the ability to assign their work 
to the public domain.163 There are many financial benefits that 
come with incorporated standards besides sales to parties who 
are mandated to comply. If some SDOs do not want to give up 
the copyright on their standards, they can simply opt not to of-
fer them up for incorporation and forego the other benefits that 
come from adoption. There are many competitors that might 
take their place, whose standards still encompass quality. And 
some incorporated standards are already made available for 
free online by their owners. This provision would also enable 
the government, legal publishers, and public advocates to pre-
vent misplacement by preserving the standard online, while 
maintaining the size considerations of the Federal Register.164  
The provision will also help agencies make standards wide-
ly available. Statutory limitations prevent agencies from violat-
ing copyrights.165 The most recent Office of Federal Register ef-
forts to reform incorporation by reference continue to reject 
many reasonable solicited public proposals because of copyright 
conflicts.166 With the provision, agencies will not be forced to 
 
 162. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 547 (discussing the shortcomings of a 
hypothetical “takings” arrangement between SDOs and government agencies); 
cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding government 
forcing private owner to transfer land to another private owner for develop-
ment of public use under Fifth Amendment). 
 163. See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 
598 (2d Cir. 1951) (“[An] author . . . may abandon . . . his copyright in [a 
work]. . . .” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, 
Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for 
the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 391–95 (2010) (discussing 
the uncertainty of copyright abandonment in case law and recent amend-
ments). 
 164. It is likely that the digital age has nullified the space-saving consider-
ations that brought about the practice of incorporation by reference in the first 
place. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 523–24 (discussing how the Internet and 
electronic distribution have replaced physical space concerns). 
 165. See Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,270 (Nov. 7, 
2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (“[W]e balanced our statutory obliga-
tions regarding reasonable availability of the standards with: (1) U.S. copy-
right law . . . .”); ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 3 
(2011) [hereinafter ACUS RECOMMENDATION] (“[T]he recommendation en-
courages agencies to take steps to promote the availability of incorporated ma-
terials within the framework of existing law.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Final Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, 81 Fed. Reg. 
4673, at *6–7 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
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negotiate access to standards with SDOs or bend to their lever-
age, and may distribute incorporated standards freely when 
adopted. Agencies encourage greater access to standards, so the 
new provision will be aligned with that goal.167 Without the 
provision, agencies will continue struggling to provide access to 
incorporated standards by being prohibited from taking any ac-
tion that would violate the copyright.168 
The provision will also provide guidance to judges in future 
cases. Judges show a reluctance to decide the copyright of in-
corporated standards because of the statutory shortcomings. 
The opinions that have denied copyright to incorporated stand-
ards come off as unsure or unwilling to fully conclude the issue, 
and even the opinions that have supported maintaining copy-
right have been vocal about courts being inappropriate for re-
solving the issue.169 A provision will provide clarity for future 
courts addressing this issue.170 
 
inforeg/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf; Incorporation by Reference, 79 
Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,268, 66,270, 66,273–74 (Nov. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 1 
C.F.R. pt. 51). 
 167. See, e.g., Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,271 (Nov. 
7, 2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (“OFR applauds all the efforts of the-
se private organizations to make their [incorporated by reference] standards 
available to the public. We encourage agencies and SDOs to continue to ensure 
access to [incorporated by reference] standards.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Final Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, 81 Fed. Reg. 
4673, at *21 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
inforeg/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf (“If an agency incorporates by 
reference material that is copyrighted . . . the agency should work with the 
[SDO] to promote the availability of the materials . . . while respecting the 
copyright owner’s interest . . . .” (emphasis added)); ACUS RECOMMENDATION, 
supra note 165, at 5, § 3(b) (“If copyright owners do not consent to free publica-
tion of incorporated materials, agencies should work with them . . . [to] pro-
mote the availability of the materials while respecting the copyright owner’s 
interest . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 169. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (“The answer to this narrow issue seems compelled . . . .” (em-
phasis added)); id. at 807 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“It bears emphasis 
that the Congress is best suited to accommodate its Congressionally-created 
[sic] copyright protection.”); id. at 808 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“[I f ]irmly 
believ[e] that for this court to be the first federal appellate court to go [this] far 
is imprudent.”); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 410–11 
(5th Cir. 2001) (stating earlier courts were wise not to conclude the issue); 
Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 735 (1st Cir. 
1980) (“While we do not rule finally on the question, we cannot say with any 
confidence that the same policies applicable to statutes and judicial opinions 
may not apply equally to regulations of this nature.”). 
 170. When the en banc Veeck decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, 
the Court first invited the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief. S. Bldg. 
Code Cong. Int’l, Inc. v. Veeck, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002). The Solicitor General 
  
2017] COPYRIGHTED LAWS 1365 
 
Critics argue this provision is too drastic and would cause 
great economic harm.171 But it is necessary to neutralize SDOs’ 
leverage. With a statutory change, the SDOs will not have the 
option to holdout and deny their incorporated standards to 
agencies, like some did with the Pipeline and Hazardous Mate-
rials Safety Administration (PHMSA).172 The Administrative 
Conference even suggests that agencies reject SDOs that do not 
compete and find competitors that will.173 In addition, even 
without selling standards, the rewards of having a standard in-
corporated into law are still compelling.174 Standards develop-
ment is a highly competitive industry.175 If the economic incen-
tives are as crucial to development as the SDOs urge, removing 
just a portion of the potential revenue from incorporation 
should increase competition among SDOs even more.176 
 
recommended denial of certiorari, advising that “[d]evelopment by the lower 
courts . . . would further clarify the effect . . . that different government use[ ] 
of copyrighted materials ha[s] on the copyright of those materials.” Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Veeck, 537 U.S. 1043 (No. 02-355) 
[hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief ]. The Court denied hearing. S. Bldg. Code 
Cong. Int’l, Inc. v. Veeck, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). This advice is flawed, because 
the sums paid for access to standards are paltry compared to the cost of litiga-
tion. There is a reason that case law of this issue is so scarce, despite the ex-
istence of the issue for decades. SDOs appear to have priced their standards at 
just the right point to be maximum lucrative while at the same time not overly 
risking attention to the conflict. Waiting for the district and circuit courts to 
ripen this issue is likely never going to happen, which makes reliance upon the 
Supreme Court for a solution folly and misguided. 
 171. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 82–83 (statement of Patricia 
Griffin, Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI) (arguing a “blanket” rule 
would infringe upon too many considerations); Bremer, Multidimensional, su-
pra note 26, at 10785 (stating such an approach is “simple, uncompromising, 
and unworkable”). 
 172. See infra Part III.C.4 (discussing SDO leverage power on government 
dependency). 
 173. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION, supra note 165, at 5, § 3(c) (“If more 
than one standard is available to meet the agency’s need, it should consider 
the availability of the standards as one factor in determining which standard 
to use.”). 
 174. See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text (discussing additional 
benefits of enactment); supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the favorable position of 
SDOs). 
 175. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 81 (statement of Patricia Grif-
fin, Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI) (describing U.S. standardiza-
tion as “[m]arket-driven and highly diversified”); cf. NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, AND TRADE: INTO THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (1995) (stating excessive uniform standardization 
reduces market choices, stifling manufacturer competition and innovation, 
and perhaps eliminating any benefit to standards at all). 
 176. See infra Part III.C (discussing the economic dependency of selling 
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Additionally, both commenters and the government warn 
against the erosion of the “public-private partnership.”177 But to 
them, the only “solution” that does not devalue the partnership 
is the current one—where the public pays to read a legal obli-
gation, gets sued for repeating it to a neighbor, SDOs leverage 
power, and the government bends to their demands.178 That is 
not a partnership. If the SDOs ceased to exist, the government 
would still write standards.179 The institutional dependency on 
SDO standards was only made possible from wrongly, but un-
derstandably, anticipating SDOs would not hold standards hos-
tage and charge for their access.180 Coupled with inflexible fiscal 
pricing, it thus seems misplaced to portray the SDO role as so 
charitable and egalitarian to be worthy of a “partnership” label. 
Making a change that increases access to the law and minimiz-
es leverage, while preserving benefits for SDO contribution, 
would help foster a true partnership. Fortunately, a complete 
copyright overhaul is not necessary to obtain this balance. Pro-
visions that add laws to unprotected subject matter and ex-
pressly dictate treatment of copyrighted works that are volun-
teered into law will have an immediate, nation-wide impact on 
improving access. 
C. INCENTIVE AND THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING 
THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
The constitutional purpose of copyright is anchored on in-
centivizing authors to cultivate benefits for society. Thus, in-
 
standards). 
 177. See Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267, 66,271 (Nov. 7, 
2014) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 51) (“One [comment] stated that access is 
important but shouldn’t undermine or dismantle the public-private partner-
ship that currently exists . . . .”); ACUS RECOMMENDATION, supra note 165, at 
2 (“Efforts to increase transparency . . . may conflict with . . . the significant 
value of the public-private partnership in standards.”); Bremer, Open Age, su-
pra note 16, at 156 (“[T]he public-private partnership . . . likely would be un-
dermined by an overly aggressive approach.”). 
 178. ACUS RECOMMENDATION, supra note 165, at 5–6 (recommending 
agencies continue to “work with” SDOs for availability); Bremer, Open Age, 
supra note 16, at 156 (arguing a “collaborative solution” that merely mirrors 
the status quo). 
 179. See Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, 
63 U. KAN. L. REV. 279, 308 (2015) [hereinafter Bremer, On the Cost] 
(“[I]ntegrat[ing] private standards into public law is not . . . [a] statutory re-
quirement.”). 
 180. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 751 (“Congress . . . 
clearly . . . [did not] anticipate[ ] that SDOs would . . . charge access fees.”). 
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centive is repeatedly discussed throughout this Note’s analysis 
because of its role in contrasting traditional lawmaking with 
SDO authorship. This Note advocates for changes that would 
reduce the financial-return incentives that are currently avail-
able to the owner of an incorporated standard. In defense of 
proposed changes to the status quo, SDOs are quick to urge 
that they are existentially dependent on maximizing the cur-
rent opportunities for financial return. Since the government 
relies almost exclusively on incorporated standards, this 
doomsday warning provides SDOs tremendous leverage for 
preventing changes that would hinder their dependency. While 
it is true that SDOs do depend on revenues that their stand-
ards generate, there is a lot of hyperbole that distorts incen-
tives and exaggerates SDOs economic reality. These changes 
are not meant to put SDOs out of business or deprive them of 
their works, but rather to establish a balance that allows both 
the public to access legal obligations and SDOs to fairly reap 
incentives for the valuable work they produce. This Section 
hopes to place economic concerns into their correct perspective 
and promote the balance of interests by showing that copy-
right’s purpose is not fulfilled by accrual of wealth, existing ad-
verse changes have not diminished SDO efforts, and incentives 
other than copyright protect against degradation of future 
standard quality. 
The most common argument advanced is that, unlike gov-
ernments which are publicly funded, SDOs are non-profit or-
ganizations that depend on standard sales to finance future de-
velopments.181 Without control over reproduction and 
distribution, SDOs would suffer a drastic revenue reduction, 
which would severely impede their standard development or 
 
 181. This Note assumes that the development costs are substantial. There 
are some claims that, taken as a whole, might suggest development costs are 
not as high as claimed. Compare OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 
8554, § 4(a) (1998) (stating member-IP contributions to development are given 
royalty-free), and MICHAEL B. SPRING & MARTIN B.H. WEISS, FINANCING THE 
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 290 (1995) (“[E]ach [member] bears the 
direct cost of participation of its experts.” (citation omitted)), and Why Charge 
for Standards?, ANSI, https://www.ansi.org/help/help.aspx?menuid=15# 
purchasing (last visited Nov. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Why Charge] (“[M]ost of 
the people working on standards development are volunteers.”), with Scope 
Hearings, supra note 22, at 83 (statement of Patricia Griffin, Vice President 
and General Counsel, ANSI) (“The standardization community believes . . . 
that the development . . . requires a massive investment of time, labor, exper-
tise, and money.”). 
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cease SDO existence entirely.182 After a shortage of SDO devel-
opment, governments would likely be forced to draft their own 
regulations and statutes, thereby draining limited time and re-
sources. Consequently, this reduction of expertise would create 
scattered variations of codes negating uniformity, safety, and 
efficiency across the nation.183 These are reasonable concerns, 
but they are not as drastic in reality. 
1. Maximizing Wealth Is Not the Purpose of Copyright 
The “ultimate aim” of copyright is “to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good,” and the possibility of fi-
nancial return for that effort is just one of many benefits (ex-
clusive control, lengthy duration, etc.) that copyright grants to 
authors in furtherance of that aim.184 The absence or limitation 
of any particular of these benefits does not necessarily defeat 
the purpose of copyright. The copyright code does not state that 
a financial gain must be preserved for copyright holders. Such a 
provision would likely be surplusage since most copyrights do 
not make money anyway.185 And despite the fact that SDOs 
have thrived for decades on selling incorporated standards,186 
numerous statutory policy exceptions already exist that in-
fringe upon the potential revenue of a valid copyright, such as 
fair use, allowing libraries to reproduce for archives, and spe-
cial reproductions for vision-impaired individuals, among oth-
 
 182. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 83 (statement of Patricia Griffin, 
Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI); see Brendan Greeley, One Man’s 
Quest To Make Information Free, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-12/one-mans-quest-to-make 
-information-free (“This source of revenue gives us great independence.”). 
 183. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 82–83 (statement of Patricia Griffin, 
Vice President and General Counsel, ANSI). 
 184. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
Additional examples are the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and 
derivation, the ability to assign ownership, and life-time duration. See 17 
U.S.C. §§ 106(a)–(c), 201(d), 302(a) (2012). 
 185. Mike Masnick, A Dozen Bad Ideas That Were Raised at the Copyright 
Office’s DMCA Roundtables, TECHDIRT (May 18, 2016), https://www.techdirt 
.com/articles/20160517/17541834469/dozen-bad-ideas-that-were-raised 
-copyright-offices-dmca-roundtables.shtml (noting the substantial difficulty 
content creators face when trying to monetize their works). 
 186. See David Halperin, Industry Groups Insist on Charging You $1,195 
To Read a Public Law, REPUBLIC REP. (May 16, 2012), https://www 
.republicreport.org/2012/industry-groups-charge-read-law (reporting that pri-
vate organizations make “tens of millions of dollars annually” selling laws to 
people). 
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ers.187 Adding another exception that would decrease some of 
the revenue potentially earned by the copyright would not vio-
late any constitutional purpose. SDOs are allowed to make 
money, not granted protection to guarantee the maximum pos-
sible revenue at all times. Such totalitarian control would un-
dermine copyright’s policy emphasis on promoting communica-
tion and societal benefit. 
2. Previous Adverse Changes in the Law Have Not Decreased 
Economic Position 
Existing adverse changes in the law have not impaired 
SDO economic reality like predicted in the argument.188 Take 
one example: the Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress In-
ternational decision handed down in 2002. At stake was an en 
banc Fifth Circuit decision that rejected the copyright claims of 
an SDO over their incorporated standards. In that case, some of 
the largest SDOs filed amicus briefs all echoing the SDO de-
fendant’s warning that their entity would diminish and their 
developments shrivel should the Fifth Circuit rule in favor of 
the plaintiff to limit the copyrights.189 The Fifth Circuit sided 
with the plaintiff, and ten years later the SDO economic reali-
ties actually improved. For example, in 2002, pre-Veeck, the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reported $58.5 
million in total revenue, with $36.4 million gross profit from 
sales of inventory (includes law sales).190 It invested $9.7 mil-
lion in code development, held $121 million in assets, paid its 
executives over $2.7 million in salaries, and spent $13,000 on 
lobbying.191 Contrast with 2012, post-Veeck, NFPA reported $69 
million in total revenue, with $33.9 million in net inventory 
sales income.192 It invested $12.5 million in code development, 
 
 187. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (limiting exclusive rights). 
 188. In its amicus curiae brief for the Veeck appeal, the Solicitor General 
expressed serious skepticism and doubt about the economic predictions, stat-
ing they were “uncertain at best” and “such organizations have survived and 
prospered despite the threat to their copyright income that has existed at least 
since . . . 1980.” U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 1. 
 189. See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 796 n.6 
(noting International Code Council amicus brief ); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. 
Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 402 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting American National 
Standards Institute, National Fire Protection Association, Underwriters La-
boratories amici). 
 190. See Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION 
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX at ll. 12 & 102 (2002). 
 191. Id. at pt. III.b l. 59, pt. V sched. A, pt. IV-B l. i. 
 192. See Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION 
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held $258 million in assets, paid executives $3.6 million in sal-
aries and bonuses, and spent $11,000 on lobbying.193 The argu-
ment’s negative effects were not realized, and indeed the NFPA 
was not the only amicus to improve.194 
This flourishing is in part because of monopoly pricing 
schemes used by the copyright holders for standards the public 
is forced to purchase.195 Professor Peter Strauss highlighted a 
perfect example:196 an FDA regulation requires the names of bo-
tanical ingredients in dietary supplements to be consistent with 
a 1992 digital pdf-only text titled Herbs of Commerce.197 The 
publisher, American Herbal Products Association (AHPA), also 
offers an enhanced 2000 edition that is not incorporated into 
law, described as “[a] must-have for anyone who writes about or 
manufactures herbal products.”198 At the time of Professor 
Strauss’s publishing, the FDA-incorporated 1992 pdf-only copy 
was $250 and the updated “must-have” edition went for only 
$99.99.199 This is a pricing scheme designed to take full ad-
vantage of its mandated compliance in law.200 
 
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX at pt. I l. 12, pt. VIII l. 10c (2012). 
 193. Id. at pt. III l. 4b, pt. X l. 16, sched. J pt. II, sched. C pt. II-B. 
 194. Likewise, in 2002 the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
reported $17.3 million in total revenue, invested $11 million in code activities, 
held $14.6 million in assets, and paid its executives over $1.8 million in sala-
ries. See ANSI, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM 
INCOME TAX at pt. I l. 12, pt. III ll. a-c, pt. IV l. 59, pt. V (2002). Contrast with 
2012 ANSI reported $36.5 million in total revenue, invested $29 million in 
code activities, held $18.7 million in assets, and paid its executives $4.98 mil-
lion in compensation and bonuses. See ANSI, IRS FORM 990, RETURN OF 
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX pt. I l. 12, pt. III l. 4e, pt. X l. 16, 
sched. J pt. II (2012). 
 195. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Cop-
yright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 309 
(2005) (“Monopoly pricing that copyright affords . . . .”); Mendelson, Private 
Control, supra note 8, at 801 (“[Old] versions of SDO standards are sometimes 
priced higher than current versions simply because a federal agency has elect-
ed to incorporate the older one by reference.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Strauss, 
supra note 16, at 537–55 (alternatives to avoid SDO monopoly pricing). But see 
Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 179, at 317–23 (analyzing the presence of 
monopoly pricing in PHMSA standards). 
 196. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 509–10 (discussing the Herbs of Com-
merce editions). 
 197. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.4(h) (2016). 
 198. Strauss, supra note 16, at 509 (quoting Bookstore, AHPA, http://www 
.ahpa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=357 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013)). 
 199. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 510. It appears the AHPA has finally 
equalized the price of the 1992 PDF copy to $99.99. Perhaps because AHPA 
has ramped up lobbying efforts to replace it, now “urg[ing the] FDA to modify 
the rule to name the [2000] edition.” AHPA Generally Supports FDA’s Pro-
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This pricing opportunity raises a peculiar observation: it 
suggests that the real value for an incorporated standard is not 
in the copyright it retains, but is really acquired from being en-
acted into law.201 Consider the conditions surrounding a $99 
purchase of a twenty-four year-outdated Herbs of Commerce 
PDF file. If the purchase is made because of the copyright mo-
nopoly, then the purchase is made because the work is one-of-a-
kind and no other substitute can be accepted (or replica creat-
ed). This can be dismissed, because an improved version existed 
for a lesser cost (now both equal in cost), yet there are purchas-
es that still opt for the outdated version. If the purchase is 
made because of it being enacted into law, then the purchase is 
made because federal regulatory violations loom overhead of 
anyone not willing to make the purchase. Thus, possessing ex-
clusive control to a book that no one wants does not raise its 
value—but getting that book enacted into law suddenly maxim-
izes its value. Further, having a standard incorporated into law 
bolsters the prestige and status of the developing organiza-
tion.202 This enables it to sell value-added products such as an-
notations, training, and certifications in addition to sales of the 
standard.203 SDOs covet this position as evidenced by aggres-
sive lobby efforts,204 infringement lawsuits against SDO com-
 
posed Rule, but Recommends Some Changes, AHPA (Aug. 18, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter AHPA], http://www.ahpa.org/News/LatestNews/tabid/96/ArtMID/1179/ 
ArticleID/374/Default.aspx. 
 200. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 801 (“The prices 
SDOs currently charge for IBR standards are not ‘platonic’ in any sense or 
even a function of the cost of production. [Adoption] of an SDO standard un-
questionably increases the demand for it and, in turn, the likely income an 
SDO will receive.” (footnote omitted)). 
 201. See Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 96 (statement of Carl Malamud, 
President, Public.Resource.Org) (“[T]he goal . . . is precisely that their work 
become law.”). 
 202. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 515 (“[IBR] . . . also confer[s] satisfying 
prestige.”). 
 203. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 806 (5th Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (“SBCCI could easily publish them . . . with ‘value-added’ in 
the form of commentary . . . and other information valuable to a reader.”); 
Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 95 (statement of Carl Malamud, President, 
Public.Resource.Org) (“The NFPA can, and does, sell all sorts of value-added 
products”); cf. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 170, at 18 (“[P]rofessionals . . . 
may have ample incentive to continue to buy the ‘official’ sets of standards 
notwithstanding the potential availability of other, unofficial editions.”). 
 204. Scope Hearings, supra note 22, at 95 (statement of Carl Malamud, 
President, Public.Resource.Org); see, e.g., Electrical Code Coalition Launches 
Website, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N (June 11, 2013), http://www.nfpa.org/news 
-and-research/news-and-media/press-room/news-releases/2013/electrical-code 
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petitors,205 and glowing press releases boasting about new adop-
tions.206 
3. A Decrease in Revenue Will Not Decrease Quality of Future 
Standards 
The SDOs’ argument asserts that without capitalizing on 
incorporated standards, future quality will deteriorate, thereby 
making industries substantially less safe. But some argue that 
the high quality of SDO standards is not a product of financial 
incentive but borne out of self-interest, such as how an archi-
tect’s interest in his own building not collapsing on top of him 
will incentivize him to produce a high quality building design.207 
Indeed, evidence supports this: for example, in the context 
of federal regulation, of the 100,000 (including non-
incorporated) SDO standards in use throughout the United 
States, Emily Bremer estimates that only two to four percent 
 
-coalition-launches-website (“[W]hich aims to facilitate direct and full adop-
tion, application and uniform enforcement of the latest edition of . . . the Na-
tional Electrical Code.”); AHPA, supra note 199 (AHPA “urging” FDA). But see 
Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 750 (stating that marketability of 
some standards rests on utility, not on the perceived benefits it were to bring 
if enacted into law (citing Strauss, supra note 16, at 546)). 
 205. See Int’l Code Council v. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, No. 02-C-5610, 2006 
WL 850879, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (involving a major SDO alleging copyright 
infringement against competitor SDO in its building code). 
 206. See, e.g., API Highlights Adoption of Industry Standards in Proposed 
Well Control Rule, AM. PETROLEUM INST. (July 17, 2015), http://www.api.org/ 
news-policy-and-issues/news/2015/07/17/api-highlights-adoption-industry 
-standar; see also Two UL Battery Safety Standards Are Now FDA Recognized 
Consensus Standards for Medical Devices, UNDERWRITERS LAB. (July 21, 
2014), http://ul.com/newsroom/pressreleases/two-ul-battery-safety-standards 
-are-now-fda-recognized-consensus-standards-for-medical-devices. 
 207. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.5.2, at 2:59 (3d ed. 2005) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine an area of 
creative endeavor in which the copyright incentive is needed less.”); cf. Scope 
Hearings, supra note 22, at 127 (statement of Darrell Issa, Rep. of Cal., mem-
ber, S. Comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, & the Internet) (“The one 
thing I know is I don’t need a copyright to promote politicians making laws.”). 
In the software industry, this is known as “dogfooding,” whereby a company 
produces a better product by forcing its use companywide. See Definition of 
Dogfooding, PC MAG. ENCYCLOPEDIA (last visited Nov. 24, 2016), 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/56655/dogfooding; see, e.g., Brian 
Bremner, The Bats Affair: When Machines Humiliate Their Masters, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012 
-03-23/the-bats-affair-when-machines-humiliate-their-masters (recounting an 
instance of a stock trading software developer launching its IPO on its own 
software and failing because of poor software). 
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are actually incorporated into federal law.208 At best, then, this 
would represent 96,000 actively used standards that are not 
earning the financial benefits of being enacted into law, either 
by SDO choice to preclude the standard from incorporation or 
by the government incorporating a competing standard instead. 
In either case, it would be a stretch to suggest that the high de-
velopment costs of the non-earning 96,000 standards were sub-
sidized just on the revenue gained from the incorporated 
4000.209 Thus, if the 96,000 non-incorporated standards were 
not subsidized by the incorporated ones, something other than 
financial gain incentivized their quality and development, mak-
ing self-interest a probable explanation. In other words, SDOs 
may invest time and resources into a standard they do not in-
tend to profit from, but to invest in one that does not even keep 
themselves safe is unlikely. 
4. The Leverage Created by Government Reliance Stifles 
Change 
The argument reflects an overall reluctance and resistance 
to change a business model that preys upon the consequences 
of violating a legal obligation. Generally, when the government 
modifies regulations, organizations must often change their 
business model to adapt.210 SDOs, however, are quick to lever-
age government dependency to prevent any policy changes that 
would disrupt their business model, and this leverage is out-
standing. 
In one instance, before Congress could investigate safety 
violations in the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion, it first had 
to absurdly track down copies of the oil pipeline standards that 
were incorporated into the safety regulations—including one 
which the American Petroleum Institute (API) demanded 
 
 208. Bremer, Multidimensional, supra note 26. 
 209. This is unlikely because of the “quite substantial” costs incurred in the 
development process of every standard. SPRING & WEISS, supra note 181; see 
also Why Charge, supra note 181 (detailing the costs of development, distribu-
tion, and administration). 
 210. See, e.g., Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama to Wall St.: 
‘Join Us, Instead of Fighting Us,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010), http://nyti.ms/ 
21tCWvF (discussing the effects Wall Street reform will have on banking 
business models); Kathleen L. Brown, Like It or Not, Obamacare Is Reshaping 
the Healthcare Industry, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
janetnovack/2014/10/07/like-it-or-not-obamacare-is-reshaping-the-healthcare 
-industry (discussing how the Affordable Care Act has “radically alter[ed] 
business models that hadn’t changed in decades”). 
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$1195 from Congress to obtain.211 In response to the payment 
demand, § 24 of the subsequent Pipeline Safety Act of 2011 or-
dered the PHMSA to no longer incorporate any SDO standards 
unless they were “made available to the public, free of charge, 
on an Internet Web site.”212 Shortly after, however, Congress 
amended the section to remove the “on an Internet Web site” 
restriction,213 to enable “greater flexibility in providing public 
access to documents incorporated by reference.”214 Some critics 
characterize this as Congress recognizing the restriction as too 
limiting on the PHMSA because public safety demands agen-
cies have the best standards as options (even if that means they 
cannot read them).215 But this downplays the cause of the flexi-
bility shortage—SDO leverage. The amendment’s House Report 
makes no mention of needing to access the best standards. In-
stead, it states that the restriction was being lifted because 
SDOs refused to act contrary to their closed-access business 
models.216 This had the effect of shutting out the PHMSA from 
standards, knowing that government dependency would force 
Congress to neuter the statute.217 
The revenue gained from selling laws makes for a lucrative 
business. But it is a business capitalizing on an unintended 
situation. As private entities performing a public good there is 
a sensitivity for preserving their efforts. Completely eliminat-
 
 211. Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 788–89; Halperin, supra 
note 186. 
 212. Pipeline Safety Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 1919, § 24 
(2012) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 60102(p)). 
 213. Pub. L. No. 113-30, 127 Stat. 510 (2013). 
 214. H.R. REP. No. 113-152, pt. 1, at 4 (2013). 
 215. See Bremer, Multidimensional, supra note 26 (“An important consid-
eration is the potential implications for public health and safety if an agency is 
prohibited from using . . . technically superior, authoritative . . . private 
standard[s].”). PHMSA was able to get seventy-eight percent of the standards 
to comply. Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 179, at 326. 
 216. See H.R. REP. No. 113-152, pt. 1, at 3 (calling it “an unintended conse-
quence”). This may not mean that all SDOs refused, but it would not have 
taken much dissent to suffocate the PHMSA, as a mere three SDOs owned 
seventy-three percent of PHMSA standards, with the other twenty-seven per-
cent being owned by only eight more. Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 179, at 
309–10. And indeed that was the case: agency dependency on a single 14,000 
page standard that could not be substituted was enough to force a statutory 
change. Id. at 327–28. 
 217. The Internet provision was the entire force of the statute, because the 
standards have always been available to the public free of charge already—in 
Washington, D.C. See Mendelson, Private Control, supra note 8, at 806 
(“[P]roviding free access to IBR rules only in a Washington, D.C., reading 
room.”). 
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ing their earnings would be counter-productive, but this Note’s 
approach only reduces a portion of their revenues. They will 
maintain their positions in a competitive industry, with many 
benefits and rewards still being obtained for adoption into law. 
Their business models will need adjustment, but this is the na-
ture of competition and regulation. 
  CONCLUSION   
Federal agencies enact private standards into law using a 
lawmaking technique called incorporation by reference. That 
technique allows law makers to forego publishing the contents 
of the standard inside of the law and merely refer to it by 
name. Members of the public seeking to comply with the stand-
ard must then obtain it from the organization that authored it. 
These private standards are copyrighted works and their own-
ers accordingly charge license fees to access them. Concealing 
and controlling access to society’s legal obligations creates sig-
nificant due process issues that demand resolution. 
Solutions that enable unrestricted access to the public are 
difficult. Generally, traditional laws are precluded from copy-
right protection. However, the copyright statutes do not contain 
any specific guidance for evaluating whether incorporated 
standards maintain their copyright after subsequently becom-
ing enacted into law. By statute, federal agencies are required 
to utilize private standards and are barred from taking any ac-
tion that would infringe their copyrights. Courts are hesitant to 
invalidate copyrights where there is no express statutory au-
thority to do so. Without any solution, the public pays millions 
of dollars each year to the copyright owners in order to access 
the standards and avoid blindly violating federal regulations or 
being subject to infringement litigation.218 
The best solution is one that allows free, unrestricted ac-
cess to the standards but preserves benefits to incentivize the 
owners to develop future standards. This Note asserts making 
two simple modifications to the Copyright Code. The first pro-
 
 218. See Complaint, Am. Educ. Res. Ass’n, Inc. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 
No. 1:14-cv-00857 (D.D.C. May 23, 2014); Complaint, Am. Soc’y Testing & Ma-
terials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-01215 (D. D.C. Aug. 6, 2013). 
See generally Carl Malamud, Pulled over for Copying U.S. Federal Law: Do 
You Have a License and Registration for That Law?, HARV. L. REC. (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://hlrecord.org/2015/02/pulled-over-for-copying-u-s-federal-law-do 
-you-have-a-license-and-registration-for-that-law (discussing recent infringe-
ment litigation). 
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vision adds the concept of laws to the subject matter exclusions 
of § 102(b). The second provision specifically places copyrighted 
works that receive legal effect into the public domain. Because 
of the copyright, agencies may only incorporate standards that 
are voluntarily offered by owners. And since there are numer-
ous benefits—besides coerced sales—that incorporated stand-
ard owners may receive, these provisions work in tandem to 
strike a balance that keeps legal obligations unrestricted while 
maintaining incentives for future standard authors. 
